Introduction

World looked forward passionately to achieve a long awaited break from the conflicts brewing up in Middle East (ME) as well as in Central Asia. A glimmer of hope kindled after withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, claiming to have achieved its objectives, and draw down from Afghanistan, already in full swing where NATO operates in unison for over a decade. Strange enough, metaphorically the winding down war intensity appears to have been negatively manipulated by Ares, the god of violence, to hype quietly the hostilities or the threat of them in a new theatre, called South China Sea (SCS). Rhetoric rumbles wide and far that the storm is building up.

Perception Variants

Some scholars appear determined to prove that talk of impending conflict in Asia-Pacific region amounts to expecting tempest in a tea-cup. Despite hostile gestures, other analysts tend to connect huge economic stakes and finding them significant, they rule out conflict. Sterling (2012) thinks, According to a Japanese business group, 30,000 firms operate in China. Japan has investments there of $85 billion....For their part, the Japanese don't want to jeopardise access to a market of 1.3 billion people. The optimism soon vanishes, however, once some warships and submarines pop up from the tea-cup and are observed conspicuously indulging in hostile manoeuvres. Ungar (2012) remarked about the ensuing tension, ThePhilippinesandVietnamhave already protested the Chinese action, but the ChineseGlobal Timesresponded that China will not back down on sovereignty issues.

Ongoing territorial tiff is likely to suck in militarily not only SCS peripheral countries like China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia but also some distant powers like India, Japan, and Australia. US gets soon bracketed by implications because of security-guarantee obligations, it owes to Japan and Philippines, besides being recognised as a lead power to keep the Asian allies mercury down. Even Australia and Canada, its traditional allies are cautious to encourage or pursue a posture that would stoke diplomatic tension. Manicom (2012) comments, Ottawa has made no secret of its preference to focus this engagement (with China) on economic issues as part of a strategy to diversify away from US markets. Perceiving these comments within the alliance, apparent ambivalence about SCS paradox by the parties ought to be seen as profuse pragmatism.

Conflict Feasibility and Limitation

Under the environments of globalised politics, the conflicts have the tragic character to expand, particularly when more than one direct party in the arena happen to be the powerful titans with heavy stakes. The chemistry of recent conflicts testifies at least two hypotheses.

First, given the prowess, it has become far more feasible to initiate a conflict by the powers, which enjoy global military reach, albeit at an exorbitant cost in men and material. In classical sense, no other power has demonstrated such versatility except NATO and recently France in Mali to sustain trans-continental operations of war. Chinese strategic reach within the sphere of South and ECS is a reality now that littoral states would find hard to rebuff. Rudd (2012) is of the view, Chinese strategic capabilities, the force structure of its military together with its emerging doctrine are aimed at supporting Chinas core interests.

Second, conflicts are becoming increasingly difficult to wrap up because of the ability of lesser powers to outsource a conflict with minimal costs but stupendous gains to keep the adversaries embroiled in a conflict, no matter how potent militarily they may be. What also lacks in the entire appreciation of the SCS crumbling security paradigm is that Chinese views and diplomacy, even if not apparently palatable, are finding scant elaboration. There is a contextual need to prefer exploratory research over descriptive one. The desirability cannot be over-emphasised even if the study culminates ultimately as a balanced combination of co-relational, descriptive and exploratory modes that tend to overlap because the tangible determinants in this narrative do not predominate. Therefore critical inquiry would enable us to raise and answer some pertinent questions.

Geography and Disputes

Geological and geopolitical contours of the arena are somewhat intricate. SCS lies to the

south of China and Taiwan, west of Philippines, northwest of Sabah/Sarawak (Malaysia) and Brunei, north of Indonesia, northeast of Malay Peninsula (Malaysia) and Singapore and east of Vietnam. It has about 250 small islands. Dramatic irony plays at the peak when all the coastal states of SCS appear determined to claim respective sovereignty and get increasingly bitter when any of them is denied approach to any feature by the other party. As a consequence there are multi-layered disputes. However, China claims the entire SCS space through famous (others possibly view it as mischievous) nine-dotted line. It appears like a loft of rope by a cowboy from Chinese coast that almost hugs the entire SCS coast.

Vectoring Security through Economic and Geopolitical Significance

Until recently it received scant attention and the SCS littorals security woes were labelled perhaps as their self-created tomfoolery. However, dawn of third millennium brought SCS into spotlight. According to initial assessment, SCS region has 8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves with 28 billion barrel of possible reserves. As regards natural gas, it has 266 trillion cubic feet. The emergence of another Middle East in Asia-Pacific is certainly a bonanza, not only SCS countries would crave for but the entire world because the promise of alternative fuels still remains elusive. Rather lavish territorial claims in SCS by China to secure future oil giants, under the obtaining scenario means a very complex tangle in the region and beyond, particularly when each actor would be weighing options and attempting to assess others degree of finesse in the realm of diplomacy.

Another factor that has bolstered the strategic significance of SCS is the enormous volume of cargo that moves through it. Year 2008 statistics show that 58 percent of the world total shipping, worth $ 435 billion went through Malacca and other straits, destined for or emanating from Asia-Pacific region (Oegroseno 2012). Recently, fast emerging vulnerability of the sea lanes, particularly in the vicinity of choke points where maritime security environments have deteriorated tremendously, has lent SCS an added dimension. Lyzhenkov (2012, p. 4), taking stock of transnational threats did not miss to underscore the need to, enhancing containers security/supply chain security. On the contrary, impending conflicts or threat of them would deliver a severe blow to operability through the vulnerable sea lanes when hostile state(s) would attempt to interdict energy supplies. SCS makes a critical area of international concern.

SCS Conflict Dynamics

Diplomacy and Posturing Antagonism

A cobweb of conflicting dynamics haunts SCS theatre. Conduct of diplomacy by the states that are party to the dispute and others who legitimise their role under available version of International Law, suggest that all analyses have to conform to different bench marks. An impression that SCS conundrum is being efficiently fed by proxies, paradoxes and profuse pragmatism simultaneously is quite relevant. The explicit stance of every actor has conciliatory tones but some policy manoeuvres made by them appear confrontational. Similarly the bracketing of US, Japan, Australia and India, in sympathy with SCS littorals antagonism against China tends to fall apart when the huge stakes of these major powers are seen interdependent as long as all remain focused on the priority objectives of boosting and sustaining their economic potentials and in the process fostering the world peace. Paal (2012) thinks, Strategic objective of United States in Asia is to manage Chinas rise. Here the clarity of emphasis resides in management and not confrontation or tit-for-tat sparring. US contemplated shift to place strategic pivot in Asia-Pacific must have come as a knee-jerk decision for the Chinese, alerting them to draw some obvious deductions, not in sync with their national interests. It was ostensibly flung like a bolt in the international arena. Not denying US, its prerogative to adjust the forces strategic posture, had the declaration been preceded by consultations with the main stake holders, it would have generated lesser controversy than it did, particularly when their economies are extensively developed and mutually engaging.

US plan to deploy a sizeable Marines force in Australia, though at considerable distance from China and pushing 60 percent warships into SCS by 2020 would logically force Chinese to assume that the stage is being set to replay World War II Pacific Campaign in reverse order. Matloff (1973, p. 506) noted, By mid 1943.... Major Allied objective was the control of South China Sea and a foothold on the coast of China so as to sever Japanese lines of communications southward and to establish bases from which Japan could..., if necessary, invaded. Chinese fear would have touched sky when the emerging pattern of US rebalancing of Asia-Pacific Pivot unilaterally is transposed in 21^st century, requiring China to substitute Japan. Conversely if there are really no hidden barbs as both need to reassure each other, the two powers can pull on amicably disregard to the fact that Chinese ships and submarines swarm around US West Coast or the US Marines are cruising in SCS with full array of deadly war arsenals. To achieve such a symbiotic equation which is so vital for the fast fragmenting world, some snares would naturally test the diplomats wizardry from both sides.

Alliances and Alignments versus Regional Security Sensibilities

Search for new alliances and cooperating partners with compatible geopolitical synergy is an ongoing phenomenon of military history. However, certain moves make others scary and lead to polarisation. Chinese suspicion stands strengthened when US, through strategic alliance with India, is found inclined to inspire it for embracing bigger role in Asia-Pacific maritime security. November 2012 dialogues between US, Japan and India, observed Indian Daily News, prove that it is not only the forum to address peace time issues but, leveraging their strengths to shape the Asia-Pacific architecture, adding further, India sought clarifications from the US about its so called Asia-Pivot Strategy which envisages roping in New Delhi as the lynchpin of security in the region. Embracing Asia-Pacific role would sound as Indian prerogative; being a potent emerging power in Indian Ocean. However, India might find it hard to encounter China in Pacific even if its military capability is bolstered by US because of Chinese projected forces preponderance and superior strategic orientation in SCS. However, there are vast areas of convergence among US and India. Hence, India has emerged as USs natural ally. Blumenthal (2007, p. 308) opines, The United States thus has a fundamental interest in assisting Indias rise as a prosperous democracy that contributes to international security. More immediately United States would like to see India play the role of counterweight on Chinas western flank (with Japan doing the same in the east). The emerging scenario would certainly be perceived by Chinese strategic defence-wizards as pincer in the offing in Asia-Pacific region to clinch China. Some experts are also sceptical about Indias role in Asia-Pacific, fearing that US efforts to march India against China may be a matter of serious conjecture as Indians are known to pursue independent approach to the global issues. Sibal (2012) is of the view, Being a pro-American is not a stigma any longer whether in politics or business though not at the cost of becoming subservient.... China has, however, possibly measured the depth of Indo-US strategic alliance and has not felt jittery about it, leaving window of reconciliation open with India for resolution of its border disputes.

Sino, Japan and Vietnams Threat Orientation

China and Japan are at odds historically and old wounds among them appear too deep to heel. Though there have been confrontations recently among them, Japan perceives Chinese force projections worrisome but manageable. Holms (2012) asserts that China would employ rope-a-dope strategy or shadow boxing with fellow Asian powers in the event of crises in Asia-Pacific region and not meet adversaries in direct fleet-to-fleet engagements. Quoting Admiral Yoji Koda, he observed, Chinese leadership can keep the enforcement ships on station near to Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, send PLA Navy task force through...as matter of routine and otherwise overtax finite Japanese leadership and electorate overtime. Ultimately Tokyo may throw in the towel .... Conversely Japan seems aware that option of peaceful settlement of dispute would only sell better at an opportune moment on the dialogue table if Japan manages to convince China that East or SCS space would never be exclusive to her but rather inclusive to some or all the littorals. Augmenting Philippines high sea capability by providing her fast manoeuvring gun- boats and scrambling fighter jet recently after an alleged threat of violation by Chinese air craft, were possibly the acts well considered not only by Japan but its allies as well.

The conflict vulnerability in SCS and ECS between China and others vary from low to high probability. Some analysts (Ciorciari & Chen 2012, p. 62) maintain, The Sino-Vietnamese feud is part of a tangled web of competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly chains and the surrounding South China Sea. Vietnam is likely to meet incessant Chinese naval provocations at forward foot, assuming that Chinas loss of face among international community would be greater after attacking a small neighbours navy and China has essentially bigger stakes for sustaining peace as economies are always conflict-shy. China, considering Vietnams mischief unbearable may be inclined to drub its navy in short and intense engagements, hoping it would be a well defined deterrent for others. China and Vietnam navies appear to have toyed with access-denial strategy recently as a defensive manoeuvre that leads us to believe that both are maintaining naval alert unobtrusively.

Chinas Blues and Opposing Manoeuvres

China does not omit noticing US encouraging gestures to Vietnam when, Defence Secretary Leon Panetta visited a deep-water Vietnamese port near the contested South China Sea..., calling access to such harbours critical as the US shifts 60 percent of its warships to the Asia-Pacific by 2020 (Alexander 2012). Their protests are also the index of intense feelings raging through Chinese leadership and public alike when US is seen equipping Taiwans military with sophisticated weapons. China perceives Taiwan as an integral part of mainland China. Hence US role amounts to encourage Taiwan to shun Chinese overtures of re-unification and prime it as one of the link in, as some call it string of pearls or pearls necklace to consummate a sort of perfect siege around China. However, China is also carving elaborate pearl-nodes to ensure adversaries access-denial and exhaust them way short of their objectives in South and ECS. Chinese forays into Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America; mainly to enhance its energy security is met with suspicion by US and her allies as their energy security stands vitally threatened by implications. Almost in parallel context, an observer had raised a question way back, asking, even if the stage setting of transition of hegemony from Anglo-Saxon-centric to Sino-centric world is accepted, remains a lot between the cup and the lips. Will the transition be peaceful or the two sides would end up locked in oil resources war as and when race for oil degenerates to oil stampede (Khan 2008, p.156)?

If China is accused of consuming all its markers, demarcating its possession through entire length and breadth of SCS, still the onus of responsibility to avert rather than initiate a conflict in SCS lies on US because the world hinges hope on US to undertake fire-fight anywhere on the planet. Its suspicions that within a few decades, US may be challenged militarily by China are also well within US prerogative to hypothesise. However, US should evolve and attempt strategies away from use of force, preventing triggering of widespread conflagration, spinning out of control. In other words, as a RAND Review (Dobbins & Cliff 2012) suggests, US be well advised to meet such aims by creating a spectre of, Mutual Assured Economic Destruction. In other words, US compulsion to remain an economic giant would further sharpen but it would deter any power to risk its economic destruction, as the threat of economic fiasco would outweigh the gains of lucrative military strategic objectives. An objective argument hints about US being alive to such an obligation, Given the growing importance of the US-China relationship and Asia-Pacific more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing anyone of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily (Glaser 2012a, p. 1).

Legal and Professional Dimensions

Forces Projection and Pretexts

Chinese show of force in SCS and harassing others, sometime searching them, has been a sore point. Their decision to establish a full-fledged Sansha Garrison on Paracel Islands in June 2012 means that another red rag has been flaunted to provoke the arenas fury. Thus Philippines and Vietnam emphatically denounced such move though China perceives act of some countries contracting foreign oil and gas companies to commence oil exploration in SCS as far more serious breach of trust than establishing a garrison with symbolic connotations rather than operational one. An expert thinks, The decision (of establishing Sansha Garrison) fundamentally challenges two key aspects of the conventional wisdom in Washington about Chinas South China Sea strategy: that Chinas assertive behaviour results from actions taken by the civil and military agencies independently of the central government and that China has been moderating its policies towards the South China Sea since 2009 (Mastro 2012).

As regards legalities of claims over the SCS territories through historical documents, China is very well equipped with huge stock of evidence to support its plea since Yuan Dynasty period though it has not shown flare for international arbitration except from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) platform. There is however, a hope for the remaining SCS states to advance their view point and press for territorial waters concessions because all of them have gone through alteration of boundaries and dynasties over the centuries. Having gained independence generally in 20^th Century, some UN conventions and International Laws support their plea to the extent of being granted respective EEZs that at the moment are denied by China. When China has not ruled out negotiations, there is a scope of settlement, step by step through multiple approaches.

Responsibility and Policy paradigm

Shifting of US focus from Middle East to Asia-Pacific can be successful and draw no ire from China though the statement appears self-negating within. It would be successful, heralding an era of peace and reconciliation if the emphasis is about the quest for peace by all parties, particularly, China and US when the latter has lien over decision making of Vietnam and Philippines also, being an ally or potential ally. To do that, a paradox has to be eliminated. Glaser (2012b) comments, Chinas neighbours seek greater US economic, diplomatic and military involvement in the region as counter balance to Chinese growing power but at the same time every country in the region also desires a close relationship with Beijing. In other words, SCS littorals are pursuing double-stream foreign policy. One, to induce US that it should remain available for all out support, even military. Second, keep Chinese connection sacred and close to heart.

US is in better position to encourage them to develop thorough understanding of China and to work towards mutual recognition of merit of grievances and resolving them rather than turning to US for every thorn-prick. Another aspect which SCS countries have to watch against is the rise of nationalist sentiments for resolving the disputes. No wonders, Vietnam and lately, Philippines have managed to mobilize their youths, condemning China and obfuscating their own governance deficits but it has also propped Chinese youths frenzy as a repercussion. They openly question Deng Xiaopings policy of appeasing SCS neighbours who advised them to maintain sovereignty over SCS but circumvent all disputes for the sake of economic prosperity of China. Rachman (2012) comments favourably about Deng Xiaoping, It was a brilliant strategy which ensured that China...rapid economic growth without significant international opposition. Chinese leaderships aggressive posture in SCS may be, more often, a response to sooth their youths and middle class on finding narrow political space. At the same time China compensates its loss of international image with propriety of tones at diplomatic levels.

Go and Shi Factor

It is a matter of conjecture whether Chinese stratagem has been understood. Lai (2012) emphasises that it would be possible only if US understood Chinese board game Go, the oldest, yet modern that is reflected in their philosophy. Interestingly Chinese entire range of philosophical twists are still nourished by Go' that is compatible and having firm roots in centuries old Sun Tzus classical Shi. The discussions in the Western world are predominantly about the narratives that are usually obvious and not on the wrapped philosophy from which the narratives emanate. Finkelstein (1999, p. 193) comments would give us the glimpse that he claims to have distilled from wide range of sources, If one were to distil all of the statements of Chinas national security objectives, both explicit and implicit, that have been publicly declared or adduced over the last few years they could be distilled to three simple words: sovereignty, modernity, and stability. From a western scholars point of view it sounds as an all encompassing remark but Chinese philosopher would differ about what he has distilled that relates to every aspiring sovereign state confronting challenges and also because it skips the interpretation through Go and Shi standards in Chinese context.

Chinese way of war and conduct of diplomacy even today is like water, denoting Sun Tzu and Lao Tzus Shi (Lai 2012). Water ultimately finds a flow-path. Conversely, Western art of war and diplomacy flow from Greek traditions; chivalrous, agile like a boxer and have tendency to match force on force, seeking immediate result on the battlefield, assumed as chessboard, even at enormous cost in men and material.

Western diplomats found during early 70s US-China thaw that when the West spoke of events maturing in months and years, Chinese planned on span of dynasties. In other words, to push negotiations against the tide of time and expecting to pluck the success like a plum from dialogue table is dangerous. During Cold War era, America won over China against Soviet Union with patience and perseverance. What is relevant part of the argument here is to highlight a point that US and its allies may not be finding rhythm with China on the security issue of SCS and getting frustrated with her but for China, SCS may be a board game on which is being played Go and Shi.

Conclusions

SCS security dilemma is not only complex but challenging. US and China emerge after evaluation from all angles of the calculus, the sole powers who would decide the destiny of SCS. However, the constructive role of other SCS border states cannot be relegated to lesser significance. The lesser powers in the region got to muster an increased sense of faith in multilateral dialogue option. Economic inter-dependability is emerging vital ground to shun war and violence as execrable acts. Spread of prosperity through economic interdependence would keep the world hostage to peace. That will remain a welcome proposition.

China, being militarily strong in SCS, draws obvious flak for coercing neighbours through its forward if not aggressive posture, driven by its weakness of domestic politics, an aspect the West does not always take into account. An analyst, who is more familiar with Go and Shi, made very realistic remarks: Over the next decade or so, the Middle Kingdoms future will hinge on the dynamic between the fear of revolution and the hope for political reform. The threat of revolution from below may push the elite to pursue incremental yet bold political reform. Should reform fail, however, revolt may well be the upshot. And the unfolding drama, wherever it leads, will undoubtedly have profound ramifications far beyond Chinas borders (Li 2013, p. 47). Hence Chinese exercise to keep the courtyard in order may be leaning on SCS geopolitics as an instrument of effective appeasement, directed inwardly.

SCS littorals and others with heavy stakes in the arena have to avoid making it the pivot of geopolitics. Choong (2013) quotes a Chinese professor, raising very pertinent questions, If China doesn`t have a Cold War mentality, why does it see the US as the main threat? If the US doesn`t have a Cold War mentality, why does it deploy so many troops in Asia? To obviate unwinding of plethora of irritants, sagacity points to an opportunity for both the arch actors to settle down, talk and build an edifice of peace that embraces South as well as ECS. Therefore, one would hinge huge hope on new leadership of China and the renewed leadership of United States of America to mobilise and commit their energies toward this end. Shi and Chess compatibility has to be explored as two-way responsibility and there is no other option.

References

Alexander, D. (2012), Access of Pacific Harbors Key to US Strategy: Panetta, Reuters, 3 June,

accessed www.reuters.com/articles, 15 September.

Blumenthal, D. (2007), Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner than China, in Sokolski, (Ed),

Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army

War College.

Choong, W. (2013), US and Chinas Anxieties, DAWN, Pakistan, accessed DAWN.COM, 15

January.

Ciorciari, J. & Chen, J, (2012), The Sino-Vietnamese Stand Off in the South China Sea,

George Town, Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring, accessed

http://journal.georgetown.edu/past-issues, 10 November.

Dobbins, J. & Cliff, R. (2012) Peace with China through Deterrence, RAND REVIEW, Rand

Corporation, accessed www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/2012, 5

November.

Finkelstein, D. (1999), Chinas National Military Strategy, in Mulvenon, J & Yang, R. (Eds),

The People Liberation Army in the Information Age, RAND National Security

Research Division (Project Air Force), accessed

www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings, 20 October, 2012.

Glaser, B. (2012a), Armed Clash in South China Sea, Council of Foreign Relations,

Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14 accessed

www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed- clash-south-china-sea, 20 September.

Glaser, B. (2012b), Trouble in South China Sea, Foreign Policy (National Security), 17

September, accessed www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012, 30 October.

Holmes, J, (2012), Can China Win without Fight? The Diplomat, accessed

www.thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat, 7 November.

Khan, M. (2008), The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia, (Raider

Publishing International, New York, London, Swansea).

Lai, D. (2012), Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China Strategic

Concept, Shi, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1 May,

accessed www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pub, 25 September.

Li, C. (2013), China at the Tipping Point, Journal of Democracy, 24:1, January, National

Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press,

accessed http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles, 15 January.

Lyzhenkov, A. (2012), Towards necessary adaptation in improving the fight against new

threats, (Presentation), Crans Montana Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, attended

18 October, accessed www.cmf.ch, 2 November.

Manicom, J. (2012), Canadas Re-Engagement Challenge with South China Sea Dispute, Asia

Pacific Foundation ,Vancouver, Canada, 30 May, accessed

www.asiapacific.ca/editorial/canada-asia-viewpoint, 31 December.

Mastro, O. (2012), The Sansha Garrison: Chinese Deliberate Escalation in South China Sea,

Centre for New American Security, East and South China Sea, Bulletin-5,

accessed www.cnas.org, 15 October.

Matloff, M. (1973), (ed), American Military History, (Centre of Military History, Lafayette,

CO), accessed www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar 10 October, 2012.

Nixon, R. (1993), In The Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal, Army Education

Press, Pakistan.

Oegroseno, A. (2012), Managing Strategic Waters in South Asia, (Presentation), Crans

Montana Forum, Geneva, attended 18 October, accessed www.cmf.ch, 29

October.

Paal, D. (2012), Dangerous Shoals: US Policy in South China Sea, Carnegie Endowment,

Washington DC, 11 August, accessed

www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/11/dangerous-shoals-u.s.-policy

25 December.

Rachman, G. (2012), China and US navigate in risky waters, Financial Times, London, 12

November, accessed www.ft.com/cms, 13 November.

Rudd, K. (2012), Dynamics Driving Chinas Policies, The Standard Zimbabwe, 11

November, accessed www.thestandard.co.zw, 13 November.

Sibal, K. (2012), The Arc of India-US Partnership, Indian Defence Review (Journal) 27:2,

April-June, Bangalore, India, accessed www.indiandefensereview.com, 30

October.

Sterling, H. (2012), Tempests toss East China Sea, (Winnipeg Free Press), accessed

www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion, 19 November.

Ungar, A. (2012), China Dares US to Respond with More than Bromides to Measures, Israel

National News, 27 July, accessed www.israelnationalnews.com/news, 24

October.

Metaphor of an Empire

Empires rose and fell in the history but none fell before the rise. The empire (a metaphor) characterised by his appeal to the masses passion rather than territories that is christened by (Imran) Khan, a cricketer turned philanthropist and later a politician, saturates the nation morally as does a mystic inspires his folks about the virtues he is determined to cling to, no matter what the cost, even life, if he has to sacrifice. This blizzard of hope has taken roots in a country soaked in corruption, anger, ethnic schism, poverty and incessant malicious blackmail from the top for last about six decades, turning the peace mongering society into fractured islands of violence.

His election campaigns sparked the ardent desire among his supporters to do something that could serve as a beacon for the posterity, heralding an era of peace and tranquillity. Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), that translates as Pakistan Justice Movement is his platform from where he speaks extempore and with conviction. Truth drips from his every word, cutting through the thick layers of vile deception that wraps all politicians (a few exceptions apart), contesting 11 May 2013 general elections in Pakistan.

Fall and Rise of Khan

An edifice of empire with centre orientation, yet an ideological one was building up fast. Everyone would love to rush to his rallies and those not finding the option feasible would get glued to TVs from the sofa brink. Then something struck like a bolt. Only three days before the elections, millions of his fans saw the towering Khan plummeting from 16 feet crashing platform. Hundreds of hearts were near to cease. It was as if the dream of Pakistan was shattering. The hope for emergence of a brilliant, meaningful and prosperous state where justice ruled was inclined to abandon us much faster than the falling Khan.

He sustained head injury and went unconscious for a while. The fall had occurred. Millions hands went up high above the shoulders; beseeching God to give him and Pakistan a chance. Lo and behold, All-knowing, All-seeing, the Merciful and the Magnificent answered prayers within minutes. Khan was back to senses, talking as if the hope had reinvigorated, pushing the entire nation in a fit of mix of jubilation and responsibility. Country appeared rising from the fall as did Khan who was on fast pace of recovery, consoling his fans from hospital bed to be calm and thrust ahead to realise PTI manifesto. He did not utter a single word to explain or complain, how and why he was tossed off the platform. With hands on the pulse of the people of Pakistan, he knew the scale and intensity of their anguish and at a critical moment he did not want to stoke their anger further. He aimed high. Brush with angel of death appears to have given him an added feel of aroma of ultimate success even if it was partially elusive this time on conclusion of current elections.

Spark of Hope

During his electioneering campaign, Khan sounded scary warnings about inevitable Tsunami to corrupt politicians and some top government functionaries against whom cases are pending in higher courts for swindling billions of rupees from states coffer. Tsunami, he described, would wash away all evils, the corrupt and others committing acts of felony but hiding behind the safety net that democracy affords even in the countries where rule of law is flouted or seen applying to the down trodden only. An elite class is above it, even when its crimes are abhorrently heinous. Dawn of 11 May witnessed an unimaginable phenomenon. Young, old men, women and children wrapped in PTI flags were reaching the polling stations before the doors opened.

Khan labelled the PTI performance akin to defeat amidst wide spread rigging episodes in Punjab and Karachi. However he was hilarious about the youths fervour with which they toiled day and night for the party. PTI has recovered from long drought. In 2002 elections, the party had yet not geared up and Khan won solitary National Assembly seat from his native constituency, NA-71 Mianwali. In 2008, PTI boycotted the general elections as a protest against the dictator, Gen Musharrafs policies. During the five years break, it concentrated on organisational aspects and opinion mobilisation that led to its impressive performance, now in 2013. Jumping to National Assembly with 33 seats in pocket, emerging as leading party in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (KP) with 34 seats and in Punjab with 22 seats, its leadership has proved that PTI is a force in national and international politics to reckon, with potentials of yet longer, perhaps trampling leaps during 2018 elections.

Election Synopsis

Summary of the election results which are yet to be officially declared amidst wide spread rigging charges, several parties have sounded, shows PML (N), a party led by Mian Nawaz Sharif has secured formidable position in National Assembly at the federal level and also in the Provincial Assembly of Punjab. PTI of Khan swept in KP with Independents and JUI (F) on the trail prominently. Province of Sindh has been bagged by PPPP and in urban centres, MQM has made significant gains. Baluchistan has been the arena of nationalist parties where major parties have not been able to demonstrate their electoral power. Significant numbers of seats have been clinched by independent candidates throughout the country with apparent motives to trade off their pivotal position as the bargain chips while extending cooperation to the leading partys race to the power corridors. In a short stipulated period, they got to join some party but in the process, there have been instances in the past that they earned millions of rupees in exchange for the electoral support to the party wishing to ascend the podium.

Ground Realities and Future Projections

Some pleasant and bitter realities have emerged. PPPP led by Asif Zardari, the scandal-prone ruling party, has been reduced to non-entity in the national assembly as well as in the provinces except in its strong hold of Bhuttos (Sindh) where it managed to keep the nationalist tinge alive despite claiming to be the secular party. Indulgence in massive corruption and allowing coalition partners to blackmail it during the entire previous term in exchange of letting the party to run the highest offices at the federal level are the main causes of its downfall. No issue of the public concern when the nation sweltered under the weight of power crises or inflation and hopeless law and order situation, were addressed by the party seriously. They consumed the term in the struggle of their survival.

PML (N) has clinched dominating position at National Assembly and Punjab Provincial Assembly. The populous province of Punjab alone has more than 50 % share in the total electoral tally. With coalition partners that it may enlist, it is likely to rule Baluchistan as well. It would be unfair, though not impossible if it attempts to hijack PTI mandate from KP to constitute PML (N)-led government through alliance with smaller parties. Thus the party is confronted by interesting paradox which, if not handled with care could ruin its index of good governance.

PML(N) has the tendency to flout the majority mandate as it did during its previous term by locking horns with Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf. As the prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif had the prerogative to appoint a chief of his own choosing but the manner he proceeded with to remove him was loathsome for the entire army. He wanted to prove himself an unbeatable macho and the Army chief a humble taxi driver as if the chief was to change the wheel only, forgetting that Army is extremely disciplined and respected institution. Even if he has learnt from his tragic episode of removal by Gen Musharraf, he is likely to fail on certain issues as one reads from his statements in last couple of days when he has yet not taken over the coveted office of the Premier. Hate for Army runs in his family genes for reasons best known to him to the extent that his brother, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, who shared PPPP government until March 2013 as the chief minister of the largest province of Punjab, gets hostile even to the retired Army officers. If ever any of them approached him for the redress of grievance, he took pleasure in giving cold shoulder to him if not an insult of the kind.

On the national and international issues, PML (N) is likely to fall trap to the glitters that are not to heal the wounds of people of Pakistan who have been afflicted with during the last about two decades. Its leadership rule would be characterised by love and hate only as it has no middle position, extremely vindictive to the foes and forgiving to its well wishers, no matter the degree of crimes they commit. Within last few days, talk of the town is that US and Saudi Arabia lent Sharif Brothers unrestricted financial support to prevent Khan Tsunami sinking PML (N) to the depths of nonentity. A journalist reportedly has pulled a loud shot through a column, claiming that to defeat Khan from Lahore constituency, Sharif Brothers doled out money to rig the election to the tune of 850 million rupees. Also their vengeance was at peak against PTI when they made two deplorable moves in Khans native constituency in Mianwali by forcing Humair Hayat Rokhri, a traditional winner family, to withdraw and leave field open for Obaidullah Shadikhel alone to win from Khan. Not stopping here, Sharif Brothers are alleged to have opened the treasure chest filled by US and Saudi Arabia for their candidate to defeat Khan, no matter what the price. Mercifully the tons of money could not purchase the proud people of Mianwali. The proofs are yet to surface from the level of wide spread gossips. Fortunately gossips in Pakistan are generally more authentic than the government inquiry commissions who produce concocted , distorted and corrupt reports.

There is a considerable hate for US but saner elements are of the opinion that powerful US must be respected and moved along as a partner. However no one, like Khan had declared, is inclined to be subservient to US. Royals of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are predominantly respected by every Pakistani, being the khadim-ul-harmaain al-shariffain but interference in Pakistani politics to such an extent to defeat a sincere, truthful and dedicated leader like Khan is against the teaching of Islam. If the Royals had to side with anyone, they should have sided with PTI on merit or stayed away from PML(N) whose past record is quite tainted.

The Elusive Maulana

JUI (F), led by canny Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, is one case in the entire exercise who has gained in 2013 general elections despite lending support to dictator to the hilt for the entire duration until 2008 and his notorious Legal Framework Order (LFO) that has been overturned by the judiciary. He is capable of speaking from the dais to scold US and Jews but off the scene, he can beg concessions from them. He is one man who has not been discovered or if the masses have registered his lust to remain part of every government minus political morality, they have not held him accountable by shunning him off on the eve of general elections. It appears as a research topic to ascertain why proud people of FATA and other provinces have failed to measure his follies.

Conclusion

PTI is likely to do well in whatever capacity it finds itself. The leadership is sincere, mature, educated and young. Even if the conspiracies by old hacks force it to play the opposition role that is equally crucial as it would have been in power. Striving for the rule of law, prevalence of justice no matter who is in the dock must remain their cardinal points of conduct. With the larger picture yet to emerge, PML (N) should be best advised to dampen its arrogant and revengeful history. It must heed PTI and other sincere political parties for the conduct of internal affairs and about the matters of foreign policy, an area it is woefully ignorant, at best emotional. Mian Nawaz Sharif, just on receiving the felicitation messages from foreign dignitaries, has started showing his cards that should have taken months to reveal in exchange for national gains. Deficit of brinkmanship was legible on his face. On the hand, the party has to root out corruption, as it has festered in Punjab even during their recent rule for several years. Dispensation of justice and building up the institutional capacity of the departments must be its top priority. It must remember claims are easy to make but need Herculean effort to implement. If peace in the country, self-sustaining economic recovery and diplomatic palpability, not necessarily through alien shadows, is not achieved the soonest possible on merit of our national interests, then we are headed for status quo. Such a monster of despair must cause shudder to every Pakistani because none can endure a corrupt and inefficient as well as biased government for yet another term. One would wish happy governance to PML (N) at the Centre, in Punjab and possibly Baluchistan, to PTI in KP and to PPPP in Sindh. Long live Pakistan and its lustrous Khan.

Author is a retired Brig Gen from Pakistan Army, holds Masters as well PhD degree in International Relations and has authored a book. Writes frequently, has participated in several national and international conferences/seminars. (dr.makni49@yahoo.com)

...but I tell you...out of this Nettle, Danger, we pluck this flower, Safety.

----Shakespeare

African continent, characterized by its geopolitical and geo-economics significance does not escape observers focus with its 54 nations, having cumulative fifth world largest economy, next to US, China, Japan and India. While ten fastest of the developing economies are located in Africa, the continent is, nevertheless, plagued by multiple paradoxes of threatening consequences. The state upheavals, insurgency, chronic human rights violations, child wars, dripping poverty, drugs trafficking, ethnic and ideological massacres eclipse its peace and stability potentials. ... way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the worst, said Thomas Hardy. In modern era, perhaps it fits well on Sahel Region. Human dignity to the African masses stands denied, a few islands of exception notwithstanding.

The Arena

Sahel Region lies between the latitudes 12⁰ N and 20⁰ N. The two latitudes run through parts of, from the east, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Senegal and Gambia. Possibly the recent flurry of worries would stand substantiated a bit more if we turn the pages of history for a while. Some old sources depict Sahel region historically a grey zone where peace and stability struggled to survive gaspingly between competing empires. In globalized world politics, the region has become more relevant because of its emergence as a menacing hotbed of organised crimes sprouting from its abject poverty. The scenario directly threatens the prosperous regions of Europe/Eurasian continents through a short hop across the Mediterranean. Like Cicero, early Roman Republic, expressing its anguish against high-sea pirates; can we label these crime perpetrators as enemies of human race? Such consensus would be easy to achieve only if international community musters collective will to render collective response to the conflicts.

Threat Dynamics

The implicit and explicit narrative to counter brief but deadly inventory of threats directed against the African masses as well as Mediterranean shores would be phase two of the response. The catastrophe, in fact, has already festered within Sahel Region as phase one of the existential threats. Hence, assessing the task and pre-empting the challenges would certainly be prudent strategy than waiting for knock by the monster. The print and electronic media has seen particular hype in delineating the threat trajectory, emanating from Sahel region. Prevailing destabilizing environments surface in nutshell as the bed-rock of the menace. Sahel region has remained marred by the extensive governance deficit that exacerbated the miseries of masses over decades. Prolonged absence of writ of states prompted the clans to coalesce inwardly to seek added security and settle scores with their foes. The tendency led to formation of organized armed militias to redress their genuine or perceived grievances. Warlords flourished, at times out-weighing military capabilities of the so called legitimate native regimes.

The region has also become heaven for the drug traffickers who operate with impunity through Colombian-Sahelian-Eurasian cartels alliance. Illicit money enables terror gangs to flourish. Large segments of public, caught in the cross fire, attempts to flee massacre and poverty. It results in boat-loads of irregular immigrants on European shores with dubious, if not criminal dossiers. Energy reserves and precious metals sites are subject of severe contention from within and without. While Africa moans, theatre of war without boundaries has also emerged in this region. Market states of consents are also grappling with transnational actors, inclined to wreak havoc as the Sahelian arena presents a perfect breeding ground for militants. There will be no clear victors and hence no conventional victory parades but the one staying the course would be winner, argued Philip Bobbitt. The region, in the wake of recent conflicts in Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, is likely to draw more debate than ever. The fact that it is in the cusp of crises would be hard to deny. Elaborate strategies, modes and magnitudes to rescue it from the kind of a tragedy emerge as daunting questions. Here the issue has been approached from Atlantic alliance perspective.

Inspirations and Inhibitions

US, Europe fraternity have its military capability harnessed by NATO that performed operational

task in Afghanistan in unison. US also has its dedicated forces command for Africa as well. Though there is no dearth of military muscle, US and Europe have to be on same page while keeping UN on board. Concurrently, understanding among P-5 would be a geopolitical prerequisite to help Sahel region manage its threats. Model interventions on humanitarian ground in Libya and recent French militarys venture into Mali did draw some critique by the quarters that had reasons to sound their dissent. The divergent approaches manifested themselves all too glaring in the context of Syrian crisis. In predominantly Muslim world, spanning over Sahel from 20-90 percent of various countries population, Islamic Maghreb and adjoining Middle East, some views, even shared by certain Western think tanks, are emerging to the contrary. The talk of creating a threat-bogey by the powers that are inclined to trample Africa through resource wars is becoming conspicuously shrilling. The patterns of recent conflicts have rendered the opponents strong arguments that (according to them) overblown crises are in fact the pretext to grab African assets. At the same time, they argue that under the hoax of Al-Qaeda and a contrived war on terror, another predominantly Muslim region would be targeted for achieving the ends that have no relevance to the pretexts. US, in effort to enforce its values, has drawn considerable volley of flak. It faces such allegations as crystallizing and aggravating the ongoing (rich) North-South (poor) dilemma, reviving the crusades and above all, attempting to maintain hegemonic imperium. Even some credible western sources share such fears.

Sahel region however, sinking in a quagmire, bears threat of impending human catastrophe in the fold. It calls for liquidating the menace in a decisive manner for humanity sake, disregard to the obtaining geo-politics, for and against arguments. Question is how to do it while eliminating the threat and at the same time, maintaining universal credibility as well?

Response Blueprint, Preparatory Posture

Employing military methodology, precisely assess the depth and magnitude of threat. A threat-prong aims inwardly at Sahelian states. International community, with larger input from trans-Atlantic alliance, should firm up Sahelian institutions functional capacities. Place their militaries sanitisation and modernisation at top of the agenda. Through extensive consultations, bring all Sahelian states and their immediate neighbours on board about inevitability of mustering collective response to achieve sustainable peace. Trans-Atlantic community should resort to diplomatic surge to seek concert within and of all other stake holders from UN platform. Strategic effort must be supported by strategic consensus. Second threat-prong aims outwardly at Europe, particularly its coastal states, Balkans and those located on southern and south-eastern periphery. They need to up the ante. Thwart arms, human smugglers and drug barons attempts of reaping illicit bonanza. Adopt passive measures like enforcing stringent laws, surveillance, sweep and search at Greece, Turkish, Bulgarian and Serbian border entry points to deter them.

Establish Sahelian Command Centre (SCC), manned by the constituent states military experts and UN observers team, to transmit real time intelligence, afforded by NATO, US African Command or any of P-5, to the military commands of the regional states. Enable them to locate, interdict and possibly destroy the carriers, collaborators or perpetrators of multifaceted organised crimes. The preparatory effort should be sanctioned by UN for a decade but subject to evaluation and performance audit every three years. When the Sahel situation stabilizes, extend SCC role to other African countries like Nigeria and Algeria to enable their governments to restore their writs, encouraging them at the same time to address their discordant root causes. Concurrently, prompt the states to achieve demonstrable bench marks on way to democracy that draws succour from absolute justice, free of shackles of class, creed, culture and faiths. Similar to provisions of accountability of crime against humanity, evolve a universal set up like ICJ, to deal with stinking corrupt rulers (Ministers, Prime Ministers and Presidents) anywhere in the world who remain out of the fragile net of respective states accountability apparatuses. UN charter should recognize corruption as a crime against humanity.

Execution Posture, Create and Deploy Military Punch

The preparatory phase is likely to come across some hiccups. SCC would also become effective gradually after coordinating and planting its tentacles with militaries of the host states. In the meantime, militaries of the region could be in reorganisation and restructuring phase. Hence pool up adequate military capability to assist SCC forthwith until it is capable of embracing the entire mission of war against rogue gangs with the help of native militaries.

Constitute a division size force under UN banner, requisitioned from African as well as Middle Eastern and South Asian countries having proven professional forces system. Designate it as UN Quick Reaction Force (UNQRF). Dominate at least three hotspots by virtue of its tactical positioning to straddle the entire Sahel region. Each segment of UNQRFs conduct of war effort should mutually reinforce others in impact. Integral mobility would enable them to react fast and maintain an edge over the militant gangs and smugglers. Decision, whether UNQRF would need any additional reserve component, say of brigade size troops, should be made contingent upon the final assessment of the magnitude of threat. Commanders preference should focus on the desirability of creating an integral composite reserve within each of three battle groups of UNQRF to afford them response flexibility for unforeseen contingencies.

*Dr. Khan is a retired Brig Gen from Pakistan Army, holds PhD degree in International Relations and is author of a book. E-mail: tajaykhel@gmail.com)